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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-1292
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LUTHER R. CAMPBELL aka LUKE SKYYWALKER,
et al., PETITIONERS v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[March 7, 1994]

  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We are called upon to decide whether 2 Live Crew's
commercial parody of Roy Orbison's song, -Oh, Pretty
Woman,- may be a fair use within the meaning of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. 107 (1988 ed. and
Supp. IV).  Although the District Court granted sum-
mary judgment for 2 Live Crew, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding the defense of fair use barred by the
song's commercial character and excessive borrowing.
Because we hold that a parody's commercial character is
only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry,
and that insufficient consideration was given to the
nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying, we
reverse and remand.
                            I
  In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock
ballad called -Oh, Pretty Woman- and assigned their
rights in it to respondent Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.  See
Appendix A, infra, at 26.  Acuff-Rose registered the song
for copyright protection.
  Petitioners Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon,
Mark Ross, and David Hobbs, are collectively known as
2 Live Crew, a popular rap music group.  In 1989,
Campbell wrote a song entitled -Pretty Woman,- which
he later described in an affidavit as intended, -through
comical lyrics, to satirize the original work . . . .-  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 80a.  On July 5, 1989, 2 Live Crew's
manager informed Acuff-Rose that 2 Live Crew had
written a parody of -Oh, Pretty Woman,- that they
would afford all credit for ownership and authorship of
the original song to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison, and
that they were willing to pay a fee for the use they
wished to make of it.  Enclosed with the letter were a
copy of the lyrics and a recording of 2 Live Crew's song.
See Appendix B, infra, at 27.  Acuff-Rose's agent refused
permission, stating that -I am aware of the success
enjoyed by `The 2 Live Crews', but I must inform you
that we cannot permit the use of a parody of `Oh, Pretty
Woman.'-  App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a.  Nonetheless, in
June or July 1989, 2 Live Crew released records,
cassette tapes, and compact discs of -Pretty Woman- in
a collection of songs entitled -As Clean As They Wanna
Be.-  The albums and compact discs identify the authors
of -Pretty Woman- as Orbison and Dees and its pub-
lisher as Acuff-Rose.
  Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million
copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2
Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skyywalker
Records, for copyright infringement.  The District Court
granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, reasoning
that the commercial purpose of 2 Live Crew's song was
no bar to fair use; that 2 Live Crew's version was a
parody, which -quickly degenerates into a play on words,
substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones- to
show -how bland and banal the Orbison song- is; that 2
Live Crew had taken no more than was necessary to
-conjure up- the original in order to parody it; and that
it was -extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew's song could
adversely affect the market for the original.-  754 F.
Supp. 1150, 1154-1155, 1157-1158 (MD Tenn. 1991).
The District Court weighed these factors and held that
2 Live Crew's song made fair use of Orbison's original.
Id., at 1158-1159.
  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded.  972 F. 2d 1429, 1439 (1992).  Although
it assumed for the purpose of its opinion that 2 Live
Crew's song was a parody of the Orbison original, the
Court of Appeals thought the District Court had put too
little emphasis on the fact that -every commercial use
. . . is presumptively . . . unfair,- Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 451
(1984), and it held that -the admittedly commercial
nature- of the parody -requires the conclusion- that the
first of four factors relevant under the statute weighs
against a finding of fair use.  972 F. 2d, at 1435, 1437.
Next, the Court of Appeals determined that, by -taking
the heart of the original and making it the heart of a
new work,- 2 Live Crew had, qualitatively, taken too
much.  Id., at 1438.  Finally, after noting that the effect
on the potential market for the original (and the market
for derivative works) is -undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use,- Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 566
(1985), the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court
for -refus[ing] to indulge the presumption- that -harm
for purposes of the fair use analysis has been estab-
lished by the presumption attaching to commercial uses.-
972 F. 2d, at 1438-1439.  In sum, the court concluded
that its -blatantly commercial purpose . . . prevents this
parody from being a fair use.-  Id., at 1439.
  We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. ___ (1993), to deter-
mine whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody could be
a fair use.
                           II
  It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song would
be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's rights in -Oh, Pretty
Woman,- under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C.
106 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), but for a finding of fair
use through parody.  From the infancy of copyright
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose, -[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts . . . .-  U. S. Const., Art. I, 8,
cl. 8.  For as Justice Story explained, -[i]n truth, in
literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout.  Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessar-
ily borrow, and use much which was well known and
used before.-  Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619
(No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845).  Similarly, Lord
Ellenborough expressed the inherent tension in the need
simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to
allow others to build upon it when he wrote, -while I
shall think myself bound to secure every man in the
enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles
upon science.-  Carey v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170
Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803).  In copyright cases
brought under the Statute of Anne of 1710, English
courts held that in some instances -fair abridgements-
would not infringe an author's rights, see W. Patry, The
Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 6-17 (1985)
(hereinafter Patry); Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (1990) (hereinafter Leval),
and although the First Congress enacted our initial
copyright statute, Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124,
without any explicit reference to -fair use,- as it later
came to be known, the doctrine was recognized by the
American courts nonetheless.
  In Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story distilled the essence
of law and methodology from the earlier cases: -look to
the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree
in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.-
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841).  Thus
expressed, fair use remained exclusively judge-made
doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in
which Story's summary is discernible:
-107.  Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
-Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright.  In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
-(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
-(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
-(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
-The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above factors.-  17
U. S. C. 107 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV).
Congress meant 107 -to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way- and intended that courts continue the
common law tradition of fair use adjudication.  H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House
Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter
Senate Report).  The fair use doctrine thus -permits
[and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.-
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
  The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules,
for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for
case-by-case analysis.  Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 560;
Sony, 464 U. S., at 448, and n. 31; House Report, pp.
65-66; Senate Report, p. 62.  The text employs the
terms -including- and -such as- in the preamble para-
graph to indicate the -illustrative and not limitative-
function of the examples given, 101; see Harper &
Row, supra, at 561, which thus provide only general
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and
Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses.
Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isola-
tion, one from another.  All are to be explored, and the
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.  See Leval 1110-1111; Patry & Perlmutter,
Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and
Parody, 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 667, 685-687
(1993) (hereinafter Patry & Perlmutter).
                            A
  The first factor in a fair use enquiry is -the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes.-  107(1).  This factor draws on Justice Story's
formulation, -the nature and objects of the selections
made.-  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 348.  The
enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in
the preamble to 107, looking to whether the use is for
criticism, or comment, or news reporting, and the like,
see 107.  The central purpose of this investigation is to
see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work
merely -supersede[s] the objects- of the original creation,
Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348; accord, Harper & Row,
supra, at 562 (-supplanting- the original), or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether
and to what extent the new work is -transformative.-
Leval 1111.  Although such transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, Sony,
supra, at 455, n. 40, the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works.  Such works thus lie
at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright, see,
e.g., Sony, supra, at 478-480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
and the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
  This Court has only once before even considered
whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued
no opinion because of the Court's equal division.  Benny
v. Loew's Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356
U. S. 43 (1958).  Suffice it to say now that parody has
an obvious claim to transformative value, as Acuff-Rose
itself does not deny.  Like less ostensibly humorous
forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process,
creating a new one.  We thus line up with the courts
that have held that parody, like other comment or
criticism, may claim fair use under 107.  See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432 (CA9 1986) (-When Sonny
Sniffs Glue,- a parody of -When Sunny Gets Blue,- is
fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (SDNY), aff'd, 623 F. 2d 252 (CA2
1980) (-I Love Sodom,- a -Saturday Night Live- televi-
sion parody of -I Love New York- is fair use); see also
House Report, p. 65; Senate Report, p. 61 (-[U]se in a
parody of some of the content of the work parodied- may
be fair use).
  The germ of parody lies in the definition of the Greek
parodeia, quoted in Judge Nelson's Court of Appeals
dissent, as -a song sung alongside another.-  972 F. 2d,
at 1440, quoting 7 Encyclopedia Britannica 768 (15th ed.
1975).  Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a
parody as a -literary or artistic work that imitates the
characteristic style of an author or a work for comic
effect or ridicule,- or as a -composition in prose or
verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and
phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in
such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.-  For
the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions,
and the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from
existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior
author's composition to create a new one that, at least
in part, comments on that author's works.  See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Dees, supra, at 437; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F. 2d 180, 185 (CA2 1981).  If, on the contrary, the
commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or
style of the original composition, which the alleged
infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to
fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes
accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like
the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.  Parody
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has
some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collec-
tive victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on
its own two feet and so requires justification for the
very act of borrowing.  See Ibid.; Bisceglia, Parody
and Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act
Into a Juggling Act, in ASCAP, Copyright Law Sympo-
sium, No. 34, p. 25 (1987).
  The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some
appropriation does not, of course, tell either parodist or
judge much about where to draw the line.  Like a book
review quoting the copyrighted material criticized,
parody may or may not be fair use, and petitioner's
suggestion that any parodic use is presumptively fair
has no more justification in law or fact than the equally
hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be
presumed fair, see Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 561.
The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for
parodists over their victims, and no workable presump-
tion for parody could take account of the fact that
parody often shades into satire when society is lam-
pooned through its creative artifacts, or that a work may
contain both parodic and non-parodic elements.  Accord-
ingly, parody, like any other use, has to work its way
through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case,
in light of the ends of the copyright law.
  Here, the District Court held, and the Court of Ap-
peals assumed, that 2 Live Crew's -Pretty Woman-
contains parody, commenting on and criticizing the
original work, whatever it may have to say about society
at large.  As the District Court remarked, the words of
2 Live Crew's song copy the original's first line, but then
-quickly degenerat[e] into a play on words, substituting
predictable lyrics with shocking ones  . . .  [that]
derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the
Orbison song seems to them.-  754 F. Supp., at 1155
(footnote omitted).  Judge Nelson, dissenting below, came
to the same conclusion, that the 2 Live Crew song -was
clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread original- and
-reminds us that sexual congress with nameless street-
walkers is not necessarily the stuff of romance and is
not necessarily without its consequences.  The singers
(there are several) have the same thing on their minds
as did the lonely man with the nasal voice, but here
there is no hint of wine and roses.-  972 F. 2d, at 1442.
Although the majority below had difficulty discerning
any criticism of the original in 2 Live Crew's song, it
assumed for purposes of its opinion that there was some.
Id., at 1435-1436, and n. 8.
  We have less difficulty in finding that critical element
in 2 Live Crew's song than the Court of Appeals did,
although having found it we will not take the further
step of evaluating its quality.  The threshold question
when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether
a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.
Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or
bad does not and should not matter to fair use.  As
Justice Holmes explained, -[i]t would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a
work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure
to miss appreciation.  Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke.-  Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 251 (1903)
(circus posters have copyright protection); cf. Yankee
Publishing Inc. v. News America Publishing, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 267, 280 (SDNY 1992) (Leval, J.) (-First Amend-
ment protections do not apply only to those who speak
clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies
succeed-) (trademark case).
  While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic
element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew's
song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on
the original or criticizing it, to some degree.  2 Live
Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy
demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal re-
sponsibility.  The later words can be taken as a com-
ment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of
street life and the debasement that it signifies.  It is
this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the
author's choice of parody from the other types of
comment and criticism that traditionally have had a
claim to fair use protection as transformative works.
  The Court of Appeals, however, immediately cut short
the enquiry into 2 Live Crew's fair use claim by confin-
ing its treatment of the first factor essentially to one
relevant fact, the commercial nature of the use.  The
court then inflated the significance of this fact by
applying a presumption ostensibly culled from Sony, that
-every commercial use of copyrighted material is pre-
sumptively . . .  unfair . . . .-  Sony, 464 U. S., at 451.
In giving virtually dispositive weight to the commercial
nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred.
  The language of the statute makes clear that the
commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work
is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its
purpose and character.  Section 107(1) uses the term
-including- to begin the dependent clause referring to
commercial use, and the main clause speaks of a broader
investigation into -purpose and character.-  As we
explained in Harper & Row, Congress resisted attempts
to narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry by
adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it
urged courts to preserve the breadth of their tradition
ally ample view of the universe of relevant evidence.
471 U. S., at 561; House Report, p. 66.  Accordingly, the
mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit
does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any
more than the commercial character of a use bars a
finding of fairness.  If, indeed, commerciality carried
presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative
uses listed in the preamble paragraph of 107, including
news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholar-
ship, and research, since these activities -are generally
conducted for profit in this country.-  Harper & Row,
supra, at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Congress could
not have intended such a rule, which certainly is not
inferable from the common-law cases, arising as they did
from the world of letters in which Samuel Johnson could
pronounce that -[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote,
except for money.-  3 Boswell's Life of Johnson 19 (G.
Hill ed. 1934).
  Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption.
There, we emphasized the need for a -sensitive balanc-
ing of interests,- 464 U. S., at 455, n. 40, noted that
Congress had -eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to
fair use,- id., at 449, n. 31, and stated that the commer-
cial or nonprofit educational character of a work is -not
conclusive,- id., at 448-449, but rather a fact to be
-weighed along with other[s] in fair use decisions.-  Id.,
at 449, n. 32 (quoting House Report, p. 66).  The Court
of Appeals's elevation of one sentence from Sony to a per
se rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to
the long common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.
Rather, as we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands
for the proposition that the -fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor
that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.- 471
U. S., at 562.  But that is all, and the fact that even
the force of that tendency will vary with the context is
a further reason against elevating commerciality to hard
presumptive significance.  The use, for example, of a
copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in a
parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first
factor of the fair use enquiry, than the sale of a parody
for its own sake, let alone one performed a single time
by students in school.  See generally Patry & Perlmutter
679-680; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at 437; Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F. 2d 1253, 1262 (CA2 1986);
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510,
1522 (CA9 1992).
                            B
  The second statutory factor, -the nature of the copy-
righted work,- 107(2), draws on Justice Story's expres-
sion, the -value of the materials used.-  Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 348.  This factor calls for recogni-
tion that some works are closer to the core of intended
copyright protection than others, with the consequence
that fair use is more difficult to establish when the
former works are copied.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend,
495 U. S., at 237-238 (contrasting fictional short story
with factual works); Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at
563-564 (contrasting soon-to-be-published memoir with
published speech); Sony, 464 U. S., at 455, n. 40 (con-
trasting motion pictures with news broadcasts); Feist,
499 U. S., 348-351 (contrasting creative works with bare
factual compilations); 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright 13.05[A][2] (1993) (hereinafter
Nimmer); Leval 1116.  We agree with both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals that the Orbison origin-
al's creative expression for public dissemination falls
within the core of the copyright's protective purposes.
754 F. Supp., at 1155-1156; 972 F. 2d, at 1437.  This
fact, however, is not much help in this case, or ever
likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep
from the infringing goats in a parody case, since paro-
dies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive
works.
                            C
  The third factor asks whether -the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole,- 107(3) (or, in Justice Story's
words, -the quantity and value of the materials used,-
Folsom v. Marsh, supra, at 348) are reasonable in rela-
tion to the purpose of the copying.  Here, attention
turns to the persuasiveness of a parodist's justification
for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will
harken back to the first of the statutory factors, for, as
in prior cases, we recognize that the extent of permissi-
ble copying varies with the purpose and character of the
use.  See Sony, 464 U. S., at 449-450 (reproduction of
entire work -does not have its ordinary effect of militat-
ing against a finding of fair use- as to home videotaping
of television programs); Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 564
(-[E]ven substantial quotations might qualify as fair use
in a review of a published work or a news account of a
speech- but not in a scoop of a soon-to-be-published
memoir).  The facts bearing on this factor will also tend
to address the fourth, by revealing the degree to which
the parody may serve as a market substitute for the
original or potentially licensed derivatives.  See Leval
1123.
  The District Court considered the song's parodic pur-
pose in finding that 2 Live Crew had not helped them-
selves overmuch.  754 F. Supp., at 1156-1157.  The
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that -[w]hile it may
not be inappropriate to find that no more was taken
than necessary, the copying was qualitatively substan-
tial. . . .  We conclude that taking the heart of the
original and making it the heart of a new work was to
purloin a substantial portion of the essence of the origi-
nal.-  972 F. 2d, at 1438.
  The Court of Appeals is of course correct that this
factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of
the materials used, but about their quality and impor-
tance, too.  In Harper & Row, for example, the Nation
had taken only some 300 words out of President Ford's
memoirs, but we signalled the significance of the
quotations in finding them to amount to -the heart of
the book,- the part most likely to be newsworthy and
important in licensing serialization.  471 U. S., at
564-566, 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We
also agree with the Court of Appeals that whether -a
substantial portion of the infringing work was copied
verbatim- from the copyrighted work is a relevant ques-
tion, see id., at 565, for it may reveal a dearth of
transformative character or purpose under the first
factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm under the
fourth; a work composed primarily of an original, partic-
ularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more
likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand
for the original.
  Where we part company with the court below is in
applying these guides to parody, and in particular to
parody in the song before us.  Parody presents a
difficult case.  Parody's humor, or in any event its
comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion
to its object through distorted imitation.  Its art lies in
the tension between a known original and its parodic
twin.  When parody takes aim at a particular original
work, the parody must be able to -conjure up- at least
enough of that original to make the object of its critical
wit recognizable.  See, e.g., Elsmere Music, 623 F. 2d, at
253, n. 1; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at 438-439.  What
makes for this recognition is quotation of the original's
most distinctive or memorable features, which the paro-
dist can be sure the audience will know.  Once enough
has been taken to assure identification, how much more
is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which
the song's overriding purpose and character is to parody
the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the
parody may serve as a market substitute for the
original.  But using some characteristic features cannot
be avoided.
  We think the Court of Appeals was insufficiently
appreciative of parody's need for the recognizable sight
or sound when it ruled 2 Live Crew's use unreasonable
as a matter of law.  It is true, of course, that 2 Live
Crew copied the characteristic opening bass riff (or
musical phrase) of the original, and true that the words
of the first line copy the Orbison lyrics.  But if quotation
of the opening riff and the first line may be said to go
to the -heart- of the original, the heart is also what
most readily conjures up the song for parody, and it is
the heart at which parody takes aim.  Copying does not
become excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely
because the portion taken was the original's heart.  If 2
Live Crew had copied a significantly less memorable
part of the original, it is difficult to see how its parodic
character would have come through.  See Fisher v. Dees,
794 F. 2d, at 439.
  This is not, of course, to say that anyone who calls
himself a parodist can skim the cream and get away
scot free.  In parody, as in news reporting, see Harper
& Row, supra, context is everything, and the question of
fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to
the heart of the original.  It is significant that 2 Live
Crew not only copied the first line of the original, but
thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics for
its own ends.  2 Live Crew not only copied the bass riff
and repeated it, but also produced otherwise distinc-
tive sounds, interposing -scraper- noise, overlaying the
music with solos in different keys, and altering the
drum beat.  See 754 F. Supp., at 1155.  This is not a
case, then, where -a substantial portion- of the parody
itself is composed of a -verbatim- copying of the original.
It is not, that is, a case where the parody is so insub-
stantial, as compared to the copying, that the third
factor must be resolved as a matter of law against the
parodists.
  Suffice it to say here that, as to the lyrics, we think
the Court of Appeals correctly suggested that -no more
was taken than necessary,- 972 F. 2d, at 1438, but just
for that reason, we fail to see how the copying can be
excessive in relation to its parodic purpose, even if the
portion taken is the original's -heart.-  As to the music,
we express no opinion whether repetition of the bass riff
is excessive copying, and we remand to permit evalua-
tion of the amount taken, in light of the song's parodic
purpose and character, its transformative elements, and
considerations of the potential for market substitution
sketched more fully below.
                            D
  The fourth fair use factor is -the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.-  107(4).  It requires courts to consider not only
the extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer, but also -whether un-
restricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in
by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market- for the original.
Nimmer 13.05[A][4], p. 13-102.61 (footnote omitted);
accord Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 569; Senate Report,
p. 65; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 349.  The enquiry
-must take account not only of harm to the original but
also of harm to the market for derivative works.-  Har-
per & Row, supra, at 568.
  Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its propo-
nent would have difficulty carrying the burden of
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about
relevant markets.  In moving for summary judgment,
2 Live Crew left themselves at just such a disadvantage
when they failed to address the effect on the market for
rap derivatives, and confined themselves to uncontro-
verted submissions that there was no likely effect on the
market for the original.  They did not, however, thereby
subject themselves to the evidentiary presumption
applied by the Court of Appeals.  In assessing the
likelihood of significant market harm, the Court of
Appeals quoted from language in Sony that -`[i]f the
intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may
be presumed.  But if it is for a noncommercial purpose,
the likelihood must be demonstrated.'-  972 F. 2d, at
1438, quoting Sony, 464 U. S., at 451.  The court
reasoned that because -the use of the copyrighted work
is wholly commercial, . . . we presume a likelihood of
future harm to Acuff-Rose exists.-  972 F. 2d, at 1438.
In so doing, the court resolved the fourth factor against
2 Live Crew, just as it had the first, by applying a
presumption about the effect of commercial use, a
presumption which as applied here we hold to be error.
  No -presumption- or inference of market harm that
might find support in Sony is applicable to a case in-
volving something beyond mere duplication for com-
mercial purposes.  Sony's discussion of a presumption
contrasts a context of verbatim copying of the original in
its entirety for commercial purposes, with the non-
commercial context of Sony itself (home copying of
television programming).  In the former circumstances,
what Sony said simply makes common sense: when a
commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the
entirety of an original, it clearly -supersede[s] the ob-
jects,- Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 348, of the original
and serves as a market replacement for it, making it
likely that cognizable market harm to the original will
occur.  Sony, 464 U. S., at 451.  But when, on the con-
trary, the second use is transformative, market substitu-
tion is at least less certain, and market harm may not
be so readily inferred.  Indeed, as to parody pure and
simple, it is more likely that the new work will not
affect the market for the original in a way cognizable
under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for
it (-supersed[ing] [its] objects-).  See Leval 1125; Patry
& Perlmutter 692, 697-698.  This is so because the
parody and the original usually serve different market
functions. Bisceglia, ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium,
No. 34, p. 23.
  We do not, of course, suggest that a parody may not
harm the market at all, but when a lethal parody, like
a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original,
it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copy-
right Act.  Because -parody may quite legitimately aim
at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as
well as artistically,- B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright 69 (1967), the role of the courts is to distin-
guish between -[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses
demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.-
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at 438.
  This distinction between potentially remediable
displacement and unremediable disparagement is
reflected in the rule that there is no protectable deriva-
tive market for criticism.  The market for potential
derivative uses includes only those that creators of
original works would in general develop or license others
to develop.  Yet the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses
from the very notion of a potential licensing market.
-People ask . . .  for criticism, but they only want
praise.-  S. Maugham, Of Human Bondage 241 (Penguin
ed. 1992).  Thus, to the extent that the opinion below
may be read to have considered harm to the market for
parodies of -Oh, Pretty Woman,- see 972 F. 2d, at 1439,
the court erred.  Accord, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d, at
437; Leval 1125; Patry & Perlmutter 688-691.
  In explaining why the law recognizes no derivative
market for critical works, including parody, we have, of
course, been speaking of the later work as if it had
nothing but a critical aspect (i.e., -parody pure and
simple,- supra, at 22).  But the later work may have a
more complex character, with effects not only in the
arena of criticism but also in protectable markets for
derivative works, too.  In that sort of case, the law looks
beyond the criticism to the other elements of the work,
as it does here.  2 Live Crew's song comprises not only
parody but also rap music, and the derivative market for
rap music is a proper focus of enquiry, see Harper &
Row, 471 U. S., at 568; Nimmer 13.05[B].  Evidence of
substantial harm to it would weigh against a finding of
fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an
important economic incentive to the creation of originals.
See 17 U. S. C. 106(2) (copyright owner has rights to
derivative works).  Of course, the only harm to deriva-
tives that need concern us, as discussed above, is the
harm of market substitution.  The fact that a parody
may impair the market for derivative uses by the very
effectiveness of its critical commentary is no more
relevant under copyright than the like threat to the
original market.
  Although 2 Live Crew submitted uncontroverted affida-
vits on the question of market harm to the original,
neither they, nor Acuff-Rose, introduced evidence or
affidavits addressing the likely effect of 2 Live Crew's
parodic rap song on the market for a non-parody, rap
version of -Oh, Pretty Woman.-  And while Acuff-Rose
would have us find evidence of a rap market in the very
facts that 2 Live Crew recorded a rap parody of -Oh,
Pretty Woman- and another rap group sought a license
to record a rap derivative, there was no evidence that a
potential rap market was harmed in any way by 2 Live
Crew's parody, rap version.  The fact that 2 Live Crew's
parody sold as part of a collection of rap songs says very
little about the parody's effect on a market for a rap
version of the original, either of the music alone or of
the music with its lyrics.  The District Court essentially
passed on this issue, observing that Acuff-Rose is free to
record -whatever version of the original it desires,- 754
F. Supp., at 1158; the Court of Appeals went the other
way by erroneous presumption.  Contrary to each
treatment, it is impossible to deal with the fourth factor
except by recognizing that a silent record on an impor-
tant factor bearing on fair use disentitled the proponent
of the defense, 2 Live Crew, to summary judgment.  The
evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged on remand.
                           III
  It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that
the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of -Oh,
Pretty Woman- rendered it presumptively unfair.  No
such evidentiary presumption is available to address
either the first factor, the character and purpose of the
use, or the fourth, market harm, in determining whether
a transformative use, such as parody, is a fair one.  The
court also erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had
necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original,
considering the parodic purpose of the use.  We there-
fore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.
                       Appendix A

  -Oh, Pretty Woman- by Roy Orbison and William Dees

Pretty Woman, walking down the street,
Pretty Woman, the kind I like to meet,
Pretty Woman, I don't believe you,
      you're not the truth,
No one could look as good as you
Mercy

Pretty Woman, won't you pardon me,
Pretty Woman, I couldn't help but see,
Pretty Woman, that you look lovely as can be
Are you lonely just like me?

Pretty Woman, stop a while,
Pretty Woman, talk a while,
Pretty Woman give your smile to me
Pretty woman, yeah, yeah, yeah
Pretty Woman, look my way,
Pretty Woman, say you'll stay with me
`Cause I need you, I'll treat you right
Come to me baby, Be mine tonight

Pretty Woman, don't walk on by,
Pretty Woman, don't make me cry,
Pretty Woman, don't walk away,
Hey, O. K.
If that's the way it must be, O. K.
I guess I'll go on home, it's late
There'll be tomorrow night, but wait!

What do I see
Is she walking back to me?
Yeah, she's walking back to me!
Oh, Pretty Woman.
                       Appendix B

        -Pretty Woman- as Recorded by 2 Live Crew

Pretty woman walkin' down the street
Pretty woman girl you look so sweet
Pretty woman you bring me down to that knee
Pretty woman you make me wanna beg please
Oh, pretty woman

Big hairy woman you need to shave that stuff
Big hairy woman you know I bet it's tough
Big hairy woman all that hair it ain't legit
`Cause you look like `Cousin It'
Big hairy woman

Bald headed woman girl your hair won't grow
Bald headed woman you got a teeny weeny afro
Bald headed woman you know your hair could look
      nice
Bald headed woman first you got to roll it with rice
Bald headed woman here, let me get this hunk of
      biz for ya
Ya know what I'm saying you look better than rice
      a roni
Oh bald headed woman

Big hairy woman come on in
And don't forget your bald headed friend
Hey pretty woman let the boys
Jump in

Two timin' woman girl you know you ain't right
Two timin' woman you's out with my boy last night
Two timin' woman that takes a load off my mind
Two timin' woman now I know the baby ain't mine
Oh, two timin' woman
Oh pretty woman